Press Room: Press Releases

Washington, DC -- Today, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator John D. (Jay) Rockefeller, issued a concerned letter to CIA Director Hayden stating that his interpretation of al Qa’ida as on the defensive does not square with intelligence assessments. Rockefeller specifically asked Hayden to inform the committee immediately if intelligence assessments had changed. Rockefeller also expressed concern that Hayden’s comments could leave the public with a misleading impression that the threat from al Qa’ida has been diminished.

 

The text of the letter follows:    

 

May 30, 2008

 

The Honorable Michael V. Hayden

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

 

Dear Director Hayden:

 

If today’s article describing an interview you gave to the Washington Post is accurate, I am surprised and troubled by your comments. 

 

The positions attributed to you are not consistent with assessments that have been provided to the Senate Intelligence Committee over the past year.  If the Intelligence Community’s assessment of al-Qa’ida has changed, I would expect the Committee to be made aware of these changes immediately.  If the assessment has not changed, then I ask that you explain why you would portray the terrorist movement as “on the defensive throughout much of the rest of the world, including in its presumed haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.”  In fact, I have seen nothing, including classified intelligence reporting, that would lead me to this conclusion.

 

The most recent National Intelligence Estimate related to the terrorist threat to the United States was issued in July 2007.  The declassified key judgments noted:

 

“Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities.  We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), its operational lieutenants and its top leadership.”

 

During a February 5, 2008, open hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell said:

 

“…al-Qa’ida remains the preeminent terror threat against the United States, both here at home and abroad.  Despite our successes over the years, the group has retained or regenerated key elements of its capability, including its top leadership, operational lieutenants, and a de facto safe haven...in the Pakistani border area with Afghanistan known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA.

 

He noted further that:

 

“…al-Qa’ida’s central leadership based in the border area of Pakistan is its most dangerous component. …al-Qa’ida’s central leadership in the past two years has been able to regenerate core operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks on the Homeland.”

 

The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Michael Maples said at the same hearing:

 

“We believe that al-Qa’ida has expanded its support to the Afghan insurgency and presents an increased threat to Pakistan, while it continues to plan, support and direct transnational attacks.  Al-Qa’ida has extended its operational reach through partnerships with compatible regional terrorist groups, including a continued effort to expand into Africa.  Al-Qa’ida maintains its desire to possess weapons of mass destruction.  Pakistani military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas have had limited effect on al-Qa’ida.”

 

In April 2008, the State Department’s 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism noted:

 

“Al-Qa’ida (AQ) and associated networks remained the greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its partners in 2007.  It has reconstituted some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities through the exploitation of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), replacement of captured or killed operational lieutenants, and the restoration of some central control by its top leadership, in particular Ayman al-Zawahiri.

 

“…instability, coupled with the Islamabad brokered cease-fire agreement in effect for the first half of 2007 along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, appeared to have provided AQ leadership greater mobility and ability to conduct training and operational planning, particularly that targeting Western Europe and the United States.  Numerous senior AQ operatives have been captured or killed, but AQ leaders continued to plot attacks and to cultivate stronger operational connections that radiated outward from Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.

 

“Throughout 2007, AQ increased propaganda efforts seeking to inspire support in Muslim populations, undermine Western confidence, and enhance the perception of a powerful worldwide movement.  Terrorists consider information operations a principal part of their effort.  Use of the Internet for propaganda, recruiting, fundraising and, increasingly, training, has made the Internet a ‘virtual safe haven.’  International intervention in Iraq continued to be exploited by AQ as a rallying cry for radicalization and terrorist activity, as were other conflicts such as Afghanistan and Sudan.  The international community has yet to muster a coordinated and effectively resourced program to counter extremist propaganda.”

 

Most recently, at his May 6, 2008, confirmation hearing to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Michael Leiter, currently the Acting Director of the NCTC, said:

 

“…we have clearly not succeeded in stopping core al-Qa’ida plotting.  We're better at disrupting it, but we have not disrupted the senior leadership that exists in the FATA, and we have also not stopped the organization from promulgating a message which has successfully gained them more recruits.” 

 

Mr. Leiter also noted that al-Qa’ida’s safe haven in the FATA poses a “dire threat” to the United States and U.S. interests.

 

There is no doubt that our superb military has had success against al-Qa’ida in Iraq over the last year.  It also is accurate that the government of Saudi Arabia has had success at disrupting plots internal to that country.  Both of these efforts are important in the global battle against al-Qa’ida, but these were always regional battlegrounds and the recent improvements represent tactical, not strategic, successes.  As all of the quotes above illustrate, the primary threat to the United States emanates from the ungoverned regions of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, not from Iraq or Saudi Arabia.  Likewise, the deaths of three senior leaders that you mentioned, while important, are unlikely to have long term effect.  Al-Qa’ida has been losing senior operatives on a regular basis for more than six years and there has been no shortage of replacements. 

 

I also dispute your assertion that the Congress is more focused on tactics than on the threat.  The Intelligence Committee’s primary focus has been on the threat to the United States.  On February 5, 2008, the Committee held an open hearing to examine worldwide threats.  You testified at that hearing along with Director McConnell and the heads of the other major analytic components of the Intelligence Community.  On February 28, the Committee held a closed hearing on Afghanistan and Pakistan.  On April 10, the Committee held another hearing examining the question of terrorist safehavens.  The Committee has established a staff working group to look at terrorist ideology, the Intelligence Community’s efforts to understand it, and the government’s efforts to counter it.  

 

The article suggests that your comments about Congress were intended as a criticism of efforts to end the CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques on prisoners.  If you view this effort as a focus on tactics, then you have failed to recognize that this program has done far more damage to our national security than any purported benefit it has provided.

 

Finally, this article includes, but simultaneously undercuts, what I believe is an important message – that we must avoid a return to complacency and the mindset that we are safe.  The threat of terrorism driven by extremist ideology will be here for many years, perhaps even generations.   If you agree and are worried about a lack of focus, why would you make statements to the press leaving the misimpression that al-Qa’ida is on the run? 

 

To take the question a step further, why would you give such an interview to the press in the first place?  At your confirmation hearing to be Director of the CIA you stated, “CIA needs to get out of the news as source and subject and focus on protecting the American people by acquiring secrets and providing high-quality all-source analysis.”  How do this interview and this story further that goal?

 

            I am intrigued, not only by the substance, but by the timing of this interview.  I understand that comments sometimes get misinterpreted or taken out of context.  I ask that you provide the Committee with a full explanation of both the rationale for, and the substance of, your interview with the Washington Post, and that you correct any inaccuracies or misimpressions from the article.   I look forward to your reply. 

 

                                                                        Sincerely,

 

 

 

                                                                        John D. Rockefeller IV

                                                                        Chairman